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2ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACDEP NGO in Ghana 
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act 
BRONGO Broker Oriented NGO 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
ECSAD Expert Centre for Sustainable Business and Development Cooperation 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
FBO Farmer based Organization 
ICCO Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
PONGO Partnership Oriented NGO 
SHANGO Shareholding NGO 
STRANGO Strategic Stakeholder Oriented NGO 
SUNGO Supervisory NGO 
SWOT Strength / Weakness / Opportunity / Threat: analytical tool 
TNT Dutch multinational in express, mail and logistics services 
WONGO Watchdog Oriented NGO 
3MAIN ACTORS IN THE THREE CHAINS (SITUATION MID 2006)
1. Ghana (Sorghum): 
ACDEP is a Christian development organization with roots in missionary work. 
ACDEP’s major focus areas are agricultural innovations, health programs, as well as 
livestock and gender programmes. Besides that, ACDEP has a documentation and 
publications unit to stimulate learning. The main reason for ACDEP to create a farmers 
network is to facilitate learning among small (unreachable) groups. As agricultural 
innovations (such as the use of organic materials, tractors use etc.) entered farmer’s 
communities, the need to share knowledge grew. However, as the production of farmers was 
small, cooperative arrangements never took off. The level of management required for 
cooperation was too low.
The ACDEP Secretariat in Tamale has around 15 staff members and receives 
financial resources from donors, such as ICCO and Cordaid (ACDEP’s budget is € 800.000 
per year). Its role is to build capacity of 40 stations, located in different areas, and having 
different priority themes. The stations have around 6-7 staff, each supported by churches and 
paid by the donors. Churches own the stations. The agriculture stations are specialized in 
provision of extension services, trainings to the farmers etc. The supporting churches and 
donors enable funding of the stations. The role of ACDEP is generally identified as an NGO, 
which acts as a broker and initiator of this project. In addition, ACDEP plays the role of a 
technical expert and innovator in areas of agriculture and farming.  
SFMC
SFMC is the Savannah Farmers Marketing Company, a private limited liability 
company promoted and registered by ACDEP and supported by ICCO. SFMC has been 
identified as a legal body, an institution, and an organisation that sells farmers’ produce to 
businesses. SFMC transfers the money (obtained by the sales of the products provided by the 
farmers) to the farmers in bulk to their group accounts. Although SFMC emphasises that its 
role is marketing within the chain, the major activities it performs can be compared to a 
wholesaler and trading company. 
Currently, ACDEP is 100% shareholder of SFMC. Two staff members were seconded 
to SFMC. Ties Kroezen is one of them and was appointed managing director of SFMC. He is 
also on the board of directors of the company. He handed over his responsibility to a local 
Managing Director in July 2006. He will still be with ACDEP until September 2007 in order 
to provide capacity building to SFMC as well as ACDEP. In the long run (3-5 years), 
ACDEP will transfer its shares in the company to the FBOs. At this stage, farmers’ 
representatives will replace the representatives of ICCO and ACDEP on the board of 
directors.
Producers / Farmers
Farmers are the producers and through the stations they supply sorghum, groundnut 
and soybean to SFMC. They usually have 2-4 acres per produce. The main food crops in 
Northern Ghana are maize, local sorghum, cassava, and yam, while the cash crops are 
soybeans, groundnuts, sheabutter, and (in low numbers) cotton and rice. Generally, there 
were differences in the communities, concerning the organisation of farmer based 
organizations (FBOs) and the willingness to cooperate with SFMC. It stands out, that there 
4were differences on the level of entrepreneurship between the communities: some were better 
organised than the other.
FBOs have internal organisation structures, where tasks are assigned to the different 
levels; Farmers have contracts with SFMC, which are managed by the leaders of the primary 
level FBOs. The FBOs institutionalised chairmen and secretaries are responsible for different 
crops. The leaders of the FBOs and the stations jointly monitor members and their farms and 
harvest. The general secretary performs the bookkeeping (registration of members etc.). The 
leaders of FBOs sign group contracts with SFMC. The leaders and the general secretary meet 
with the station staff on a regular basis (as secondary level FBO).
Farmers are supported in food security activities through animal husbandry, health 
care trainings, farming etc. Trainings are provided by MoFA (see below) and ACDEP 
stations, depending on the skills needed for trainings and the capacity of both parties (MoFA 
provides mainly agricultural extension services). 
ICCO
ICCO provided a grant to ACDEP in order to set up SFMC. Moreover, ICCO has 
played the role of initiator of the developed chain. Accordingly, ICCO’s role can be described 
as being a donor and mediator. Next to this ICCO and ACDEP have a collective competence, 
which is of sharing and learning.
GGBL
Guinness Ghana Breweries Ltd is a large company producing beer for the African and 
European market under licences. The brewery in Ghana is one of the few Guinness breweries 
in Africa. Guinness largely buys sorghum for its beer in Nigeria. However, they prefer to buy 
it in the country they are working in, i.e. Ghana. Since one year Guinness started to buy 
sorghum from SFMC, still in relative small quantities, as most of the sorghum is imported 
from Nigeria. The partnership with SFMC could change this situation in the future.
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
Organization of FBOs is one of the priorities of the government of Ghana, as it creates 
an attractive environment for farming. The government has ± 400 officers, who support FBO 
activities. But generally, the opinion is that church based organisations and NGOs have better 
possibilities to organize FBOs than the government, as they have a broad network and more 
resources (Source: MoFA). The government department in Tamale is supported by a World 
Bank grant, provided for approximately nine years. This grant is used to pay the salaries of 
the employees. Hereby, MoFA strives to cooperate with church based organisations, and 
NGOs to develop FBOs and extension services for farmers. The government mainly operates 
in the areas where NGOs and church based organisations are not active. The role of the 
ministries is mainly to provide education on farming, agriculture and innovations. But the 
government acts mainly in areas where benefits can be obtained, so it has less interest in non-
export areas (for example food-crops).
2. Burkina Faso / Mali (Mangoes): 
Producers / UFMB 
Four cooperatives of mango producers, two in Burkina Faso and two in Mali, had 
fairtrade certification in late 2005/early 2006. The two cooperatives in Burkina Faso are 
former members of an umbrella organisation for farmers’ cooperatives called Union Fruitière 
et Maraîchère du Burkina (UFMB). Initially fairtrade certification was held exclusively by 
5UFMB, later on the two former UFMB-cooperatives were certified directly and the umbrella 
UFMB was decertified. The two cooperatives in Mali were certified later than their 
Burkinabe counterparts exported fairtrade mangoes for the first time in 2005.  
The cooperative visited during the field research was the Sibirila cooperative for 
mango producers in Mali. The cooperative unites farmers from seven villages, the village 
from which Sibirilla derives its name being the one located most centrally. The amount of 
land they use for mango production varies from ¼ to 12 hectares. For these farmers mangoes 
are not the main source of income, cotton being an economically more important crop for the 
farmers (many of whom are also a member of a cooperative of cotton producers). Existing 
mango trees have been planted mainly with the objective to substantiate land ownership. 
Also, the farmers pointed out, the trees provide food, shade and a potential extra source of 
income. Harvesting mango trees for export is a new activity for the Sibirila members.  
In order for the farmers to be able to produce fairtrade mangoes, they receive 
technical assistance which is coordinated by Helvetas. Experts visit the farmers and help 
them to improve the quality and size of the harvest and to obtain organic certification. 
Helvetas also assists the cooperative in terms of strengthening its organisational capacity and 
in communicating with the pisteurs and Fruiteq.  
The board of the cooperative includes a chairman, a secretary and a treasurer. The 
involvement in fairtade exports provides an important incentive for the individual farmers to 
be involved in the cooperative. Contacts with the next part of the chain (the pisteurs) and with 
support organisations (technical experts and Helvetas) are maintained at the cooperative 
level. Furthermore, the fairtrade premium is being paid by the importer in Europe (AgroFair) 
to the cooperative rather than to the members directly. The decision how to invest the 
premium is made by the cooperative. Sibirila is currently using the money for road 
improvements, as no hard surface road connects the Sibirila village to the outside world.  
Pisteurs1
The pisteurs act as the harvesters and consolidators of the mangoes. To carry out the 
work they hire pickers (young men) for a specific period in return for a fixed payment based 
on the number of days they do this work. The work of the pisteurs and their teams is not 
included by FLO in the assessment and certification process.
WAFF/Fruiteq
Initially fairtrade mangoes from Burkina Faso were exported by UFMB. However, to 
improve the exporting capabilities of UFMB this activity was branched off in a separate 
export organisation, Fruiteq SARL. In 2005 West African Fair Fruits Ltd (WAFF) acquired 
ownership of Fruiteq. WAFF is a Ghanese firm which aims at coordinating the export of 
fairtrade fruit from West Africa at the regional level. WAFF is itself owned by AgroFair 
Europe BV2. Fruiteq owns an export station in Bobo Dioulassou, Burkina Faso, and shares its 
use with Burkinature, an exporter of organic fruit.The mangoes from the areas around Bobo 
Dioulassou (Burkina Faso) and Sikasso and Bougouni (Mali) are sent by truck to the station 
by pisteurs. There a selection is made based on maturity and quality. The selected mangoes 
are then cleaned,sorted by size, and packed.  Various logistical service providers are engaged 
by Fruiteq in order to transport mangoes by train to Abidjan, and from there by ship to 
Europe.
1 Based on interviews with two pisteurs and two of their workers in Bougouni, Mali. 
2 http://www.agri-profocus.nl/docs/bijdrage4_FairShareFairSayFairPrice.pdf, and email Rob Moss WAFF Ltd. 
To Jennie van der Mheen, ICCO 
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AgroFair Europe BV is a Dutch company with its headquarters in Barendrecht. It 
imports into Europe fairtrade bananas, mangoes, pineapples and citrus from various parts of 
the world. The company is 50% owned by Cooperative Producers AgroFair, which represents 
the cooperatives that produce the fairtrade fruit which AgroFair imports. The remaining 50% 
is governed by the Dutch development NGO Solidaridad, the investment company Viva 
Trust, and two alternative trading companies, Twin (UK) and CTM (Italy)3. AgroFair was 
established in 1996 in order to benefit small-scale fruit producers through fairtrade: '[...] 
AgroFair is the only fruit company with Fairtrade as its core value'.4 AgroFair pays a fairtrade 
bonus to its supplier cooperatives. The bonus for the West African mango producers is 
calculated at the end of each harvesting season on the basis of the quantity of fruit traded by 
AgroFair as fairtrade fruit. AgroFair imports its mangoes via the port of Antwerp. Its storage, 
ripening and distributing centre for mainland Europe is in Barendrecht.
3. Uganda (Cotton): 
Lango Organic Farming Promotion (LOFP/ APEX) 
LOFP is a local NGO owned by organic farmers. The NGO is responsible for the 
Internal Control System (ICS) of the project and was established in 1998. Through the ICS, 
LOFP monitors and registers farmers as organic producers. The objective of LOFP is to grow 
and to produce more cotton and in the mean time to increase the income of their farmers. In 
addition, LOFP performs marketing activities within the chain and provides training to 
farmers. LOFP also assists growers, organises meetings and trainings and co-ordinates 
purchase from and payment to farmers. An APEX committee that appoints a co-ordinator 
carries out the affairs of the NGO. The APEX Committee members are elected by the 
growers once every four years. The APEX organisation consists of 12,000 farmers that grow 
organic cotton. LOFP resides under the umbrella of NOGAMU, which is a national 
movement advocating and influencing policy towards the promotion of organic cotton.
Lango Co-operative Union (LCU)  
LCU was established in 1956 as a cooperative of cotton farmers. This was exceptional 
as individual foreign entrepreneurs from Great Britain and India formed most cooperatives in 
those days. About 40.000 farmers are a member of this cooperative. Out of these 40.000 
farmers, 12.000 farmers are cultivating in an organic way.  
LCU has a ginnery, Ngetta, which processes cotton to cotton lint. The cooperative has been in 
charge of purchasing, ginning/processing, the quality control and export of the organic 
produce on behalf of Bo Weevil. In 2003, LCU signed a MoU with Bo Weevil and LOFP. As 
a result of conflicts of interest and differences in vision, this partnership agreement was 
cancelled in March 2006.
Bo Weevil 
Bo Weevil is involved in the production and marketing of organic cotton seeds and 
guarantees the ecological quality of the products throughout the processes of cotton 
production. Bo Weevil BV was set up by the end of 1989 by organic food wholesalers. The 
objective of Bo Weevil is to stimulate, initiate and manage projects in the field of fair trade 
and sustainable cotton and textile production. The company has an office in Ermelo, the 
3 www.agrofair.nl d.d. 04/07/06 
4 AgroFair, Annual Report 2004, 13 
7Netherlands, with the aim to coordinate activities. Core products of Bo Weevil are cotton, 
sesame, and chilli peppers.  
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has granted a large part of the costs for 
building a factory. An independent body for organic certification, EcoCert, is in charge of 
inspection and certification. Bo Weevil is the contractor, financer and owner of the 
certificates, while EcoCert carries out seasonal inspections. Next to this, Bo Weevil covers 
the operation costs of the NGO LOFP, gives training to the field staff, assists farmers during 
the growing season and commits to take their crop at a fair price. 
The major buyer of Bo Weevils produce is Remei AG. However, as Bo Weevil 
recognises the importance of local value adding, they established a joint venture with Phenix 
Logistics Uganda Ltd. Currently Bo Weevil has applied for a PSOM grant at the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to build a cotton ginning factory together with Phenix 
Logistics Ltd.
ICCO
ICCO has been involved in this project since 2002, mainly though the provision of 
crop finance to Bo Weevil. As the capacity of LCU to manage the financial resources was 
weak, ICCO decided to channel crop finance via Bo Weevil, with the aim to buy organic 
cotton from the farmers. The availability of crop finance is crucial in this chain, according to 
ICCO. Farmers prefer to sell their produce as soon as possible, as they fear that they will lose 
their produce in insecure moments (attacks by LRA, the Lord’s Resistance Army), risk that 
the produce will be burnt). Therefore, if crop finance is not available on time to buy organic 
cotton with a premium price, there is a risk that farmers will sell their produce to any other 
buyer, thereby missing the premium they worked for. In such cases, the organic cotton is 
usually sold as conventional, because Bo Weevil is the owner of the certificate and farmers 
cannot sell their produce as certified on individual basis. Next to the crop finance, ICCO has 
supported LCU with capacity building and finance of equipment. 
HIVOS
Hivos is another Dutch co-financing agency involved in this project. The organisation 
has a contract with the NGO LOFP to finance capacity building activities of the staff 
members of LOFP and the farmers. Moreover, Hivos covers the operational costs of LOFP.
Hivos used to strive to decrease the grants to LOFP in the long run and required the 
improvement of the management capacity and decrease of operational costs. Next to this, 
Hivos has a joint fund with Triodos Bank: the Hivos/Triodos Fund (HTF). Requests for crop 
finance are usually submitted by external parties to Triodos. Hivos and Triodos Bank assess 
jointly the project, whereby Triodos evaluates the financial feasibility and Hivos the 
development aspects. By approval, HTF provides the crop finance to the concerning party, in 
this case Bo Weevil.  
Cordaid
Cordaid is also a Dutch co-financing organisation that has played a role of financer in 
this chain. Cordaid has provided a part of the crop finance to Bo Weevil. Together with ICCO 
and Triodos Bank, the three organisations provided Bo Weevil the necessary amount for per 
season. However, Cordaid required that Bo Weevil would seek for crop finance at local banks 
in Uganda. Therefore, from the beginning, it was clear that the commitment of Cordaid to 
support this project was temporary.  
8Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
The MoA in Lira has 20 sub-counties, with 2 staff members per sub-county. Main role 
of the MoA is to provide farming advice and conduct training to farmers. However, due to 
lack of financial resources, no trainings are provided at present. In the past, the ministry had a 
Cotton Development Project, which was partly financed by the World Bank. Within this 
project, successful farmers organised meetings and used demonstration plots to inform and 
train other farmers.  
Next to training, MoA has the role to monitor the activities of the NGOs in the area. 
Although MoA also has the aim to train farmers and increase their capacity, it recognises the 
value of LOFP activities as the NGO is specialized in giving training to cotton farmers, while 
the ministry provides general farming trainings.  
The MoA and other governmental parties did not play a role in this specific partnership. 
Interviews with several actors (LOFP, Bo Weevil, and Royal Netherlands Embassy) revealed 
that involvement of the government in a partnership would not be advantageous. This is due 
to the high level of corruption within the governmental departments in Uganda. 
Cotton Development Organisation in Lira (CDO) 
The CDO is a department of the MoA, which is in charge of the development of the 
cotton sector in Uganda. Uganda is divided in six cotton producing regions, each having a 
local CDO. The main goal of the CDO is to regulate and monitor the cotton industry and 
advice the MoA on policy and activities. Local CDOs distribute seeds to the ginneries in the 
region. The ginneries provide the seeds to farmers, which in turn provide produce to the 
ginners. Moreover, the local CDOs have the task to look at the needs of the region and 
regulate laws concerning cotton production in that specific region.
The CDOs work closely with the national Uganda Ginners Association. Seven 
ginneries located in the Lango region are member of Uganda Ginners Association. These are 
Dunuvant, Rafique, Twin Brothers, South Best, LCU, and Jinda International Textile 
Cooperation. Depending on the capacity, one lead ginner per region is chosen. In Lango 
region the lead ginner is Dunuvant. Although Bo Weevil does not have a ginnery (yet), it is 
involved in the meetings of Uganda Ginners Association, in order to include organic cotton 
matters in the agenda. 
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It is becoming increasingly accepted that partnerships between NGOs and companies can be 
a powerful tool for stimulating sustainable development. Momentum is being created to 
explore structural cooperation between different kinds of stakeholders. The call for improved 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) is inducing businesses to seek a balance between their 
profit generating activities and their potentially broader role in society, while the increased 
significance of market forces is driving civil society organizations like NGOs to reconsider 
their attitudes towards the market. Now, partnerships are receiving new attention on the 
interface of business and civil society (profit and non-profit), precipitated by the growing 
complexity of increasingly internationally defined issues, changing stakeholder dynamics and 
recognition of convergent interests. Given that profit- and non-profit actors have potentially 
complementary roles to play in stimulating sustainable development, structural forms of 
strategic stakeholder dialogue are needed to channel that momentum effectively.  
These issues have been the focus of a long term collaborative research effort between the 
Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and the Expert Center for 
Sustainable Business and Development Cooperation (ECSAD). ICCO is a co-financing 
development NGO in the Netherlands with extensive hands-on experience setting up 
partnerships. ECSAD is a network of researchers from the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
the University of Amsterdam, the Maastricht School of Management and Nyenrode Business 
University with extensive experience researching development issues and relations between 
business, civil society and government. This collaborative effort was initiated in 2004 and has 
generated a number of outputs along the way (see reference list at the end).
Partnerships are complex and can differ considerably from one another. This research project 
is based on partnerships aimed at achieving sustainable development goals by setting up 
sustainable international commodity chains. This setting to some extent establishes the 
boundary conditions for the conclusions and lessons learned. First, in the cases examined, the 
partnerships and the commodity chains they support are all in relatively early stages of 
development. The emphasis is therefore on the developmental- and introduction phases of the 
chain ‘life cycle’ (see below). Second, the chains typically involve at least one (but 
sometimes more than one) of each of the following: a ‘Northern’ NGO, a ‘Northern’ 
company, a ‘Southern’ NGO, a Farmer based organization (FBO), a ‘Southern’ company (in 
e.g processing and/or aggregation), and various governmental bodies in the host country. 
Where possible, this research aims to generate lessons relevant for all parties. However, given 
the nature of the research project and the project team, the emphasis is on lessons primarily 
relevant from the NGO perspective.
The need for a ‘rough guide’ to partnerships 
The literature on partnerships shows that partnerships can be beneficial for a number of 
reasons. They allow organizations with distinct competences to exchange know how and 
facilitate ‘cross-fertilization’. Companies can gain more insight into their effectiveness in 
addressing societal problems while at the same time reaping reputational benefits from 
increased social responsiveness. In the case of partnering for sustainable commodity chain 
development, partnerships can help companies reduce risk by spreading costs and reducing 
risk through e.g. enhanced transparency. NGOs can gain insight into the workings of markets, 
gain access to resources that companies have at their disposal, develop new models for 
resource allocation and gain greater credibility and leverage with respect to their own donors. 
As a result partnerships for sustainable commodity chain development can help NGOs to be 
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more effective at their own core business (in the case of ICCO, poverty reduction) through a 
better understanding of the business case side of chain development. Moreover, the cases 
studied by ECSAD / ICCO suggest that partnerships can be part of an effective sustainable 
development approach.  
At the same time partnerships are not without risks. Particularly for the NGO, commitment to 
shared objectives of any kind with a company poses the risk of cooptation, particularly where 
a clear imbalance of power exists between the company and the NGO. Particularly in the 
start-up phase, business and NGO cultures may clash, in particular where visions of 
sustainability diverge from visions of profitability. Furthermore, problems can and do arise 
over time, as a result of which partners may exit the relationship. This is related to the long 
term nature of such endeavors, and therefore the need for a long term, shared strategic vision.  
The current ‘rough guide to partnerships’ is intended to summarize the lessons learned 
through the research in a practical fashion so as to provide support for organizations 
considering the ‘hows’ of the partnership approach. Its purpose is not so much to provide 
answers to specific questions, but rather to help organizations consider which questions need 
asking. Its primary relevance, in accordance with the project’s research design, will be for 
NGOs that seek insight in the development of a systematic and structured approach to 
partnerships. However, the multi-stakeholder approach to the project enables us to offer 
insights that are also relevant for other actors, including ‘Northern’ companies open to 
partnering, ‘Southern’ NGOs, local and donor governments, and farmer-based organizations 
(FBOs).
The ‘basics’ of partnerships in sustainable commodity chain development 
This document is organized as follows. As stated above, the aim is to assist organizations in 
their strategic decision-making by helping them to ask the right questions and offering 
examples of tools to support the formulation of answers. Questions and tools are clustered 
around ten topics related to partnering and are formulated in a generic way so as to make 
them accessible to organizations of all kinds, not just NGOs. There is a certain chronological 
development to the topics (starting with the choice for partnership strategy and ending with 
partnership / chain exit strategies), but it need not be utilized in that order. None of the items 
is intended to reflect an exhaustive discussion of all relevant issues and considerations, but 
rather to guide organizations and individuals (who consider) working with partnerships. 
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1. PARTNERSHIPS AS STRATEGIC CHOICE AND POSITIONING
Recent research on existing partnership strategies reveals that companies engaged in 
partnerships for sustainable development have pro- or interactive approaches to addressing 
social issues.5 For NGOs, the choice for partnerships is a strategic decision on how best to 
reach their core objectives, but also involves issues of positioning towards companies as well 
as positioning towards other NGOs and society. Externally, the NGO must ask whether a 
partnership strategy is the best choice or whether there are more viable alternatives to reach 
the same goal? Internally, a critical assessment of the NGO’s own capabilities is required, 
such as whether partnerships ‘fit’ the NGO’s strategic vision.
It has also been shown that the partnership strategy is only one of numerous positioning 
strategies that NGOs can adopt. In the Position Paper (Van Tulder et al., 2004), a range of 
NGO roles were discussed that exist along a continuum of (inter)dependence with respect to 
companies. A positioning as ‘WONGO’ (Watchdog-Oriented NGO), for instance, entails an 
adversarial relationship with business in which the NGO is fully independent from the 
companies it monitors. A ‘SHANGO’ (Shareholding NGO) on the other hand exercises 
influence on the company through shareholder pressure but also relies on the company for its 
financing (in the form of stock dividends). A SHANGO strategy entails a higher degree of 
dependence than in the case of the WONGO. In the case of the current research, we have 
explored the role of a Partnership Oriented NGO (PONGO), which entails yet a higher degree 
of (inter)dependence.
It is important to note that a PONGO positioning as opposed to a SHANGO or WONGO is a 
strategic choice of the NGO. Therefore the development of a sustainable partnership strategy 
requires a thorough evaluation of an NGO’s strategic orientation, and how an organization’s 
vision, knowledge and competences can create a fruitful basis for sustainable positioning. At 
the same time, matching the NGO’s positioning with the company’s attitude towards societal 
issues defines the potential for structural cooperation. Both conflicting and converging 
interests play an important role in the partnership debate. Although in an ideal world, 
converging interests are more important than conflicting interest, in practice both are equally 
important. Partnerships can therefore be considered a form of ‘critical cooperation’6 whereby 
convergent and divergent interests are balanced through structural and continuous stakeholder 
dialogue.
In addition to accounting for the multiplicity of roles and interests, the literature emphasizes 
that partnerships can be win-win if both parties demonstrate sufficient commitment, where 
communication lines are open, where linkages and synergies are exploited, where the 
relationship is given a formal status with a clear division of responsibilities, and where both 
partners behave towards each other with integrity. The search from both sides is for the 
building blocks of cooperation and the strengths which will enable the NGO to be an equal 
partner in a market-driven environment.  
5 Muller, A., Noor, M., De Boer, D, Timmer, D., Van Putten, Frans-Paul, Van Tulder, R., & Fortanier, F. (2006) 
A Comparative Analysis of Commodity Chains, Partnerships and Development in Ghana (Sorghum, Burkina-
Faso and Mali (Mangoes) and Uganda (Cotton). Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
6 Van Tulder, R., Muller, A. & De Boer, D. (2004) Partnerships, Power and Equity in Global Commodity 
Chains, Position Paper on cooperation between companies and NGOs in Stimulating Sustainable Development. 
Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
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The question of whether or not a strategic fit exists between the organization’s capabilities 
and the possibilities offered by partnering can be addressed through SWOT analysis. SWOT 
stands for ‘Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats’ and is a tool that relates the 
organization-internal side (strengths and weaknesses) to the organization’s external 
environment (opportunities and threats). In this way organizations can assess their future 
strategy. It is important to recognize that SWOT analysis is not done in a vacuum: strengths 
and weaknesses are to be considered relative to the ‘competition’; that is, relative to other 
NGOs, or relative to other companies, depending on which actor is being considered.
Questions that might be addressed include: 
Internal (strengths / weaknesses) 
D Is there a fit between our long-term vision of development, our understanding of our role 
in society, and a partnership strategy? 
D What specific (organizational) capabilities do we possess that would make us better suited 
to a partnership strategy than our ‘competitors’? 
D What are the minimum ‘threshold’ capabilities needed to be successful (resources, 
international networks, etc.)?  
External (opportunities / threats) 
D Is there demand for, and general acceptance of, partnerships as a mechanism for 
sustainable development? 
D Are there additional sources of funding aimed at organizations interested in partnership 
strategies (such as government subsidies)? 
D Will our major stakeholders (donors, investors, employees) consider this to be in line with 
our mission and strategy? 
In the case of ICCO’s recent partnership experiences, for example, we see that ICCO 
possesses specific resources that represent strengths, such as an extensive network of 
partnering with other Northern NGOs as well as Southern NGOs. Externally, it is also evident 
that the demand for partnerships is growing and, in the case of the Netherlands for example, 
the government has decided to make partnership strategies a priority in its own development 
approach. This creates opportunities for additional financial, societal and political support. 
Still, the ‘strategic fit’ between ICCO’s mission of poverty reduction / market access for 
small farmers in the South and cooperation with companies (‘multinationals’) may not always 
be evident to ICCO’s internal- or external stakeholders. As such one of the outcomes of a 
SWOT analysis can be a conscious choice to redefine the organization’s culture, e.g. a shift 
from a role as WONGO to one of “Partnership-Oriented NGO” (PONGO). 
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2. THE LINK BETWEEN THE ‘PARTNERSHIP’ AND THE ‘CHAIN’
It is important to emphasize that the terms ‘partnership’ and ‘chain’ are not synonymous. 
Actors in the chain consist of all primary stakeholders with a vested economic interest in the 
production and trade of the commodity in question (in this case mangoes, cotton and 
sorghum). This vested interest can be explicit, as in the case of the farmer producers and the 
purchasing company, or implicit, as in the case of the NGOs that support the producers and 
the trade relationship with time, money and or expertise. The partnership has a different 
function. The partnership serves to reduce uncertainty and risk in the chain explicitly, through 
the joint provision of public goods (e.g. financing infrastructure), as well as implicitly, 
through the establishment of mutual trust and commitment.  
Experience shows that in general only a subset of chain actors is actively involved in a 
partnership. While the long-term viability of the chain would beg the structural involvement 
of as many chain actors as possible, in earlier stages of chain development, strategic 
flexibility may be hindered by attempts to include all actors. As chains become more mature 
and self-sustaining, the number of actors in the partnership may be reduced as more market-
based mechanisms adopt the function of the partnership, and ultimately the partnership as 
such may be dissolved entirely. Both the partnership literature as well as the partnerships 
studied for this particular project reveal that two actors function at the core of the partnership: 
the ‘Northern’ NGO and the ‘Northern’ company. These two possess the greatest and most 
well-rounded ‘portfolio’ of strengths (networks, financial resources, knowledge and tools) 
essential to the development and longer-term functioning of a partnership. 
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3. PARTNERSHIP ROLES
In principle, companies and NGOs can adopt a range of different positions in their 
relationship, and these positions will affect the chances afforded by partnerships. Within the 
‘PONGO’ strategy, four possible roles can be identified: the broker, the donor/financier,
the technical assistant, and the technical expert (Table 3.1).7 In practice, a PONGO can 
fulfill a combination of the above as well, as the salient issues in the chain can change over 
time.  
x A broker performs an intermediary role between business partners in the North and 
business partners in the South in the establishment of the chain. Financing is not part of 
this role.  
x A donor / financier bears some of the risk necessary to establish the chain. The local 
partner NGO in collaboration with the business partner(s) is implementing partnership 
projects financed by the Northern NGO. The intervention of the Northern NGO focuses 
mainly on auditing (and project cycle management activities) of the provided finances. 
x A technical assistant invests at arm’s length in capacity building of potential business 
partners or sub-contractors such as cooperatives. Assistance comes in the form of 
knowledge or other tangible resources related to know-how, skill development or capacity 
building that is provided without dedicating personnel on the ground in the South. 
x A technical expert dedicates resources in the field to local economic development. In 
this instance the NGO provides knowledge in terms of the local environment and of 
possible stakeholders such as potential partners/ competitors, communities, etc. It could 
be the NGO’s role to map the supply chain of a possible product, which has export 
market potential (either in the region or further abroad). Activities might include 
feasibility and mapping studies of potential marketable products. In addition, the 
technical expertise role can be used for specific training in commodity related activities, 
for example in increasing the quality of the farmer’s products. 
ICCO’s experiences in Ghana (in the aborted partnership with Vlisco and the sorghum 
partnership with Guinness), Burkina Faso / Mali (in the partnership with AgroFair / Fruiteq) 
and Uganda (in the partnership with BoWeevil) show that it is common for an NGO to play 
multiple roles simultaneously. In all cases, ICCO has played a donor/financier role, in most 
cases also a broker role and in the mango case also that of a technical expert.8 It is not always 
clear whether multiple roles are effective: while it demonstrates the commitment of the NGO 
to ‘jump into the breach’ when necessary, it has been observed in the cases studied that 
multiplicity of roles can reduce transparency in the partnership and hinder effective 
communication (see also Section 8). At any rate, the ‘role’ decision needs to be taken in light 
of the issues that exist in the chain in various phases, and given the organizational strengths 
of the NGO (see SWOT above). 
7 At the time of writing, discussions were still ongoing as to the possibility of a fifth role, that of ‘project 
developer’. The project developer role reflects the need for an actor with an overall vision that binds the 
partnership together. It is not yet clear, however, whether such a role is suitable for an NGO or that others, such 
as governmental bodies, would be better-suited to such a role. 
8 ICCO has complex arrangements to support technical experts in the field who, although they report to ICCO 
and depend in part for their income on ICCO, are not employed by ICCO itself. Since this does not strictly fall 
under the definition of technical expert as used above, we construe this arrangement more as an expression of 
the donor/financier role. 
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Generally speaking, companies can play a range of roles in partnerships as well, from a 
philanthropic role to a business development role (table 3.1). Philanthropy can take either the 
form of gifts or sponsoring. The transactional role refers to the provision of capacity building 
or support in ways that is directly in line with the company’s core business; the classic 
example is TNT’s support of the World Food Program. The experience with AgroFair / 
Fruiteq, Bo Weevil and Guinness documented in Muller et al. (2006) shows that in the case 
of partnerships aimed at sustainable commodity chain development, a greater level of 
commitment is required of the company than might be the case in partnerships in other 
contexts. In such cases business must demonstrate the highest level of commitment, described 
as a ‘business development’ role. The business development role entails engagement “with 
the objective to establish or develop further sustainable business in other parts of the world” 
(Van Tulder et al., 2004: 24).
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It deserves mention that thus far no effort has been made to develop a typology of partnership 
roles (as opposed to chain roles) of other chain actors. This deserves attention as it would 
help in painting a more complete picture of partnerships beyond the central axis of NGOs and 
companies. Finally, as noted above, Van Tulder et al. (2004) pay considerable attention to the 
possibility of playing other roles in addition to the ‘PONGO’ role such as ‘WONGO’, 
‘SUNGO’ etcetera (see also Table 6.1 below). Playing additional roles of the type referred 
here can not only enhance the effectiveness of the partnership and the functioning of the 
chain, it can also create a counterbalance to the (inter)dependent PONGO role. 
Complementing the PONGO role with another role can help the NGO maintain its integrity 
and independence from its business-oriented partners, thereby reinforcing its credibility 














4. A ‘LIFE CYCLE’ VIEW OF COMMODITY CHAIN DEVELOPMENT
The concept of sustainable commodity chains is linked to the notion that such chains should 
be(come) self sustaining over time. That is, the facilitating role played by the partnership 
structure in providing ‘public goods’ and reducing uncertainty and risk in the chain should 
eventually give way to a more fluid structure whereby market mechanisms (e.g. purchasing 
agreements made on open markets) substitute for the partnership’s function as a tool for 
reducing uncertainty and risk.
This ‘dynamic’ view of partnership functioning in commodity chain development can be 
linked to the life cycle of the chain. Standard life cycle approaches are used for understanding 
the market development and decline for a given product over time. A variation on this theme 
would be to consider the development of the chain over time. Given the notion that a self-
sustaining chain should ultimately be able to function in international markets, it is possible 
to link the phases of chain development to the degree of insulation or exposure to market 
forces changes. Figure 4.1 below illustrates this concept. 
Figure 4.1 shows for instance that considerable insulation from market forces is required in 
the early stages (development through growth) of the chain. This is because a certain degree 
of stability and predictability is required to reduce additional uncertainty for all parties in a 
venture that is by definition uncertain (the establishment of a new international commodity 
chain). The figure also shows that commodity chains can develop in different directions as 
they mature, depending on the opportunities present and the characteristics of the chain, its 
production base, market demand and the capabilities of actors in the chain. In general three 
paths can be realized: the scale path, based on greater volumes which lead to the possibility 
of reductions in per-unit costs; the value added path, based on forward integration in the 
chain by producers into additional value-adding functions like processing; or the 
diversification path, whereby potential synergies are explored in terms of additional 
commodities linked to existing crop rotation strategies etcetera. The key lesson is that the 
partnership must be based on an explicit vision of chain development.  














































































5. SELECTING VIABLE CHAINS 
A certain amount of tension exists between the aim of helping ‘the poorest of the poor’ on the 
one hand and the aim of initiating chains that are feasible. Experience thus far suggests that 
investing in chain development in settings with (relatively) high potential is a practical way to 
enter the learning curve. Later on, as organizations with better developed partnership 
strategies build on previous experience, some of the more challenging possibilities can be 
explored.
A point of departure for considering chain viability would be to consider existing 
organizational capacities. In what areas does the organization have relevant expertise (e.g. 
horticultural), or established international networks (with companies, local NGOs, research 
institutes). This will likely lead to a ‘short list’ of possible opportunities, which subsequently 
have to be explored through e.g. feasibility studies.9 Linking chain opportunities to 
organizational capacities can also be part of a more focused SWOT exercise beyond that used 
for the partnership strategy more generally (see section 1 above). Questions that need to be 
addressed exist on the supply side and the demand side, but also with respect to the 
international institutional environment and the potential target (‘host’) developing country. 
5.1 Market side 
D What is the nature of market demand for the commodity in question?  
For instance, cotton may or may not be feasible, depending on the quality and potential to 
demand a premium. As compared to the case of cotton in Uganda, the experience with Vlisco 
in Ghana showed that chain development of a standard commodity produced at relatively 
high cost in an international environment characterized by intense competition, subsidization 
and overproduction likely would not have been viable. 
D What niche possibilities exist for the introductory / growth phases? fair trade; fair 
food; fair labor; organic (or a combination thereof)?  
The (internationally traded) commodities in which ICCO has gained its experience all have 
specific features that allow them to develop manageable market segments and thus offer the 
possibility to differentiate from the commodity as a generic product. In the case of cotton 
(Uganda), quality and organic cultivation generate possibilities for premium, as does the fair 
trade label for mangoes from Burkina and Mali. In the case of sorghum (Ghana), the ‘niche’ 
is perhaps that the sorghum demanded by Guinness is one it is developing itself (the Kapaala 
strain).  
D Are there market actors already active in this chain or similar chains (similar by e.g. 
country or commodity)? 
In the case of Ugandan cotton and Ghanaian sorgum, BoWeevil and Guinness (respectively) 
were exploring the market looking for potential supply. This type of interest deserves 
attention. Similarly, companies linked to related commodities (in terms of horticultural 
characteristics) or already active in the same country but for other commodities, may be 
interested in expansion. 
9 Alternatively, it is possible to choose the demand side as point of departure. 
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D What opportunities for growth exist?  
- Scale, based on increased volume and corresponding reductions in per-unit 
production costs? This may be most applicable in the case of Ugandan cotton. 
- Value added, such as refining, processing or drying? This may be relevant for the 
mango chain in Burkina / Mali. 
- Diversification into other commodities, particularly linked to crop rotation 
possibilities and other potential sources of synergy? This may be a relevant 
strategy for sorghum farmers in Ghana. 
5.2 Supply side
D What is the potential for improving (productive) capacity on the supply side? 
This refers for instance to the organizational capabilities of the producers. Are FBOs already 
active? How well developed are they? What are they lacking (financial management skills, 
adequate infrastructure etc.)? We have seen that the experiences in the three cases vary to 
some degree. For instance in Ghana, cooperative arrangements have been difficult since 
farmer production was very small scale, while in Burkina FBOs were much better 
established. In most cases it is evident that a lack of monetarization or supporting financial 
institutions limits the ability of farmers to increase production and improve stability. 
Organizational aspects also refer to the ability of farmers to develop a holistic view of the 
chain, such as understanding the characteristics of demand (consumer tastes). 
D To what extent do functioning market mechanisms exist? 
How responsive are producers to financial / market stimuli, that is, do they have previous 
experience with borrowing on market terms, long-term supply contracts, or mechanisms for 
dealing with free-riding or defection? What is the legacy of previous experience with 
‘donors’ and how will this affect chain viability? It was evident in the ICCO cases that the 
lack of financial institutions (stable monetarization) and a casual attitude towards 
development assistance among recipients (‘donor’ culture) have hindered development of 
production capacity and capabilities on the supply side. In Ghana, however, the marketing 
organization SFMC has made great strides in developing mehanisms to reduce defection and 
improve contract enforcement.  
D How viable and feasible would the commodity be on international markets?
Does the commodity have specific characteristics that may offer an advantage on the market 
(e.g. high quality cotton)? What are the costs of inputs and how might these change in the 
future? Linked to the market side (5.1) is the ability of the supply side to deliver a product 
relevant for a particular niche in the market. Cotton from Ghana, for instance, was deemed 
unviable due to high costs and low returns, while cotton in Uganda, with its organic premium 
and high quality, clearly has an advantage. In terms of positioning strategies, It is important 
to consider the longer term prospects for supply development: for instance, the sorghum case 
documented that changes in rainfall patterns in Northern Ghana have the pattern to adversely 
affected sorghum production.   
5.3 Institutional context 
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D International trade structure 
It is important to understand the international production and marketing structure of the 
commodity in question. Cotton, for instance, may be less attractive than other commodities 
given the current state of overproduction in countries like China and Vietnam. Additionally, 
an understanding of which countries are involved in which stages of production or value 
adding is imperative, because the partnership and the local producers in the South must 
recognize their position in a larger network.
D Institutional framework surrounding trade and production
It must be clear at the outset whether restrictions to trade exist, or conversely whether there 
are opportunities for preferential treatment. Are changes expected that might adversely (e.g. 
end to the Multi-Fiber Agreement) or positively (AGOA) impact chain development? What 
will the role be of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and how will they influence 
exports?
D Host country development goals 
As observed elsewhere, the countries in the South that host the partnerships and developing 
chains have development objectives of their own, which largely fall under one of the 
following: 1) increasing output and productivity; 2) increasing employment; 3) increasing 
value-adding activities; 4) increasing and diversifying exports; or 5) increasing human 
capital. A demonstrable strategic fit between the chain development strategy and host country 
development goals will facilitate institutional embeddedness and enhance legitimacy of the 
project. Additionally, that institutional embeddedness will likely reduce perceptions of risk 
on the part of the partnering company. 
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6. LINKING ISSUES AND ROLES TO LIFE CYCLE PHASES
A partnership strategy requires a timeline and planning, including various phases of chain 
development, since roles and needs vary according to the life cycle of the chain. The case of 
cotton in Uganda has shown that chain actors traditionally considered to be most vulnerable 
to the exploitation of market power by a single, dominant buyer, such as the farmers, actually 
value the stability that a monopsony relationship entails. Therefore the discussion with regard 
to concentration in the chain needs to be linked to the phase of the chain. 
Roles as indicated in the table below are suggestive of the range of possible roles that might 
be appropriate in a specific phase. They are not meant to imply that any one organization 
should perform all of them. A number of items have been included to illustrate the relevance 
of a longitudinal perspective on chain development for numerous strategic considerations. 
For example, additional (secondary) roles that the NGO can perform outside of its PONGO 
strategy, or variations in the concentration of market power that can be conducive to stable 
chain development, or insight into expected profit levels (of the partner company in this 
case). The table is filled in in an indicative manner and may be amended or complemented as 
necessary.
Two additional points can be made here. First, it follows from Table 6.1 that actors can join 
existing partnerships (e.g. as the result of a repositioning) and that actors can exit partnerships 
as their roles become superfluous (e.g. exit in the event of sufficient scale that the chain 
becomes economically viable).  
Second, actors not directly involved in the economic process (in particular NGOs, but also 
government agencies) can position themselves at different points in the chain, depending on 
salient issues in the chain, and the organization’s strategic vision and capabilities. In the 
development phase, for instance, it may be more relevant to intervene upstream in the chain, 
i.e. at the producer stage, while in the growth phase issues may be more salient downstream 
(such as monitoring demand characteristics for a particular commodity, or changes to 
certification requirements). 
Table 6.1: Issues and roles by phases of chain life cycle 
Development Introduction Growth Maturity Repositioning Renewed growth 
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Questions that need to be addressed, therefore, include: 
D What issues (are likely to) exist during each phase? 
D Which actors might play which roles during which phase? Which partners may join or 
exit the partnership during which phases? 
D At what position in the chain (upstream or downstream) are interventions required, and 
which organization(s) has/have the relevant capabilities to supply those functions? 
D What interventions, during which phase and by which partner, address which issues?  
D Are there additional roles that need consideration based on the issues that exist? 
The result is in effect a mapping exercise in which chain issues are linked to organizational 
capabilities of various actors. While individual actors can engage in this exercise, ultimately 
there will need to be some general agreement between actors as to the definition of phases, 
issues and roles. Additionally, Table 6.1 shows that an actor (in this case the NGO) can play 
multiple roles – not necessarily simultaneously, but in different phases. Thus far no research 
has been conducted that explores how organizations can transition from one phase to the 
next, and therefore from one (or more) role(s) to the next. ICCO’s experience so far in this 
respect is limited, since the cases studied are still in the start-up phase.
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7. SEARCHING FOR VIABLE PARTNERS
The chances for success are in large part dependent on the possibility of bringing in capable 
and reliable partners. It is clear that the establishment of trust forms the key prerequisite for 
pursuing a partnership. But in addition to the interpersonal / interorganizational aspect of 
partnering, tools should be developed that can help assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
each actor with respect to a given role with greater objectivity and effectiveness, considering 
how those strengths and weaknesses can affect the outcome.  
Primary issues: Strategic fit & complementarity 
D Is there potential for a win-win situation for both / all parties? 
Both parties (here referring to company and NGO) must be able to identify the value of a 
partnership and commitment to chain development. For the NGO this must be in terms of its 
own objectives (e.g. poverty reduction) but also in terms of positive externalities (reputation 
gains). The company will also want to benefit from positive externalities, but more tangibly 
will need the chain to attain some level of profitability. 
D Is there potential for a shared strategic vision as to the chain development strategy? 
There must be some level of agreement as to what chain development entails, and in which 
direction the chain should develop. If not, partnership members may be working towards 
mutually exclusive goals. Is the key improved market access, or enhanced value-adding 
opportunities? This means there must be a joint recognition of the salient issues in the chain 
and the types of interventions – broadly speaking – that are required to create the conditions 
for the win-win described above. 
D Is there potential for complementary resources and capabilities?
Complementarity is one of the cornerstones of a successful partnership. Each partner should 
bring its own unique capabilities and resources to bear in order to realize the benefits of 
partnering. The company, for instance, may have a better understanding of market conditions, 
demand characteristics and production requirements in the North, and perhaps better 
government connections in the South. The NGO may have better local connections in the 
South (e.g. through local partner NGOs) and understanding of development issues as well as 
capacity building skills that will help improve supply side problems.  
D In the case of a potential partner company, is there evidence that the company is 
committed to a Business Development role?
The experiences of ICCO thus far have shown that companies engaged in partnerships for 
commodity chain development appreciate the extra demands that exist in the development 
context and are committed to addressing the issues facing business development in that 
setting. While this by no means implies that businesses are not aiming for profit, it does 
represent a high level of commitment that needs to be recognized and accepted. 
Secondary issues: The potential for positive or negative spin-offs
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D Is there a strategic fit in terms of brand associations among important stakeholders?  
Part of the win-win situation is the potential for mutual reputation gains. One factor that 
emerged in the review of the literature on partnerships, but was not explored in the ICCO 
cases, was that of brand fit. This means that the ‘image’ of the NGO and that of the company 
must be compatible. This can be at a fundamental level (e.g. ICCO finds its inspiration in the 
Christian tradition and mission and its roots in the Dutch Protestant-Christian churches. A 
company that is not open to the religious aspect may have trouble working with ICCO) or at a 
more practical level (e.g. if the company in question is part of a larger conglomerate that 
engages in activities which conflict with the NGO’s objectives such as strip mining). 
D Are there reputation risks involved (e.g. due to major PR crisis that the potential 
partner faced recently)? 
Similarly, if one of the potential partners has suffered a major public relations crisis in recent 
years (e.g. Nestlé and infant formula), this may reflect poorly on other partners, in particular 
the NGO. While this may be unlikely given that potential business partners interested in 
sustainable development tend to be committed to CSR (see Muller et al., 2006), even 
responsible companies face unexpected issues from time to time (see Van Tulder, 2006). 
D Is there evidence that the partner is prepared to proceed on the basis of 
transparency? 
 Nowadays, secrecy is associated with having something to hide. The creation of trust – not 
only between partners, but also with the public at large – is linked to transparency. Therefore 
partners must be willing to share information with one another and communicate on the 
partnership strategy to the outside world. This involves not only public relations, but also 
openness to realistic evaluations of the project as it develops, for instance by third parties.
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8. ESTABLISHING THE PARTNERSHIP
Establishment of the partnership is part of the developmental phase of chain development. 
Which interests conflict, and which correspond? Address these differences explicitly – get 
them on the table, or they will come up later at a less ‘convenient’ moment. 
8.1 Exploration phase 
D What tensions exist between equity (development goals) and effectiveness (company 
goals)?
Try to understand each other’s ‘language’ (see Section 7). 
D What tensions exist between longer term (competitive advantage and development) 
and short term (survival) goals?
Short term utility is often unrelated to long-term sustainability. The ICCO experience shows 
that considerable investment up front is needed from all parties before a chain enters the 
growth phase, a process which can easily take five years or more. 
D What tensions exist between the needs of the chain as a whole and the needs of 
individual partners or chain actors? 
Find ways to balance the ‘big picture’ with the ‘reality on the ground’. Simply put, this means 
that it is difficult to satisfy all partners / actors at all times. In order to manage expectations 
effectively, partnership members should maintain the ‘big picture’ view and derive from this 
the consequences (cost / benefit) for all actors / partners at various phases of chain 
development. For example, it may be concluded that the continued emphasis on capacity 
building of LCU in Uganda, even after it became clear that LCU was too weak to perform its 
role effectively, was detrimental to the partnership (and chain development) as a whole. 
8.2 Execution phase 
D Set realistic targets
Organizations and managers are typically under pressure to deliver results. This applies to 
NGOs as much as it does to companies. Given such pressures and the myopia that develops 
when individuals focus on a project, there is a risk of setting unrealistic targets (e.g. “self-
sustaining chain within two years”). All parties must realize that development is a long-term 
exercise.
D Be explicit about division of labor / roles and (financial) responsibilities
The desire to “make things happen” and to maintain an atmosphere of trust can tempt 
partners to avoid placing all the issues on the table. The “mapping exercise” referred to in 
Section 7 will help to minimize this risk. Also, if any one actor considering playing multiple 
roles, some effort must be made to establish a clear division of responsibilities and make the 
multiple roles clear to the various partners and actors in the chain. 
D Consider additional roles that need to be fulfilled
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If so, what actors might play that role? An assessment needs to be made of the issues in the 
chain, interventions required, and the resources and capabilities of potential partners. In some 
cases, it may be practical for one actor to play multiple roles, not least because additional 
partners add multiple levels of additional complexity. However, there is a trade-off involved 
in that multiple roles can be confusing to other partners and chain actors. In practice, it seems 
logical to explore existing chain actors (e.g. traders, processors) as potential partners before 
looking outside the chain (e.g. embassies), but clearly some needs cannot be fulfilled by 
chain actors. For instance, one of the needs identified to varying degrees in all three of the 
cases studied pertains to the development of financial institutions available to the producers. 
External actors, such as development banks or some intergovernmental body may be required 
to play this role. 
D Consider whether any actor(s) should be excluded from the partnership  
Partnering is not only a question of which actors to engage, but also involves conscious 
choices about which actors not to engage. For instance, in Ghana ICCO made a conscious 
decision not to engage Wienco BV for the sorghum partnership. Such decisions, and their 
consequences, should be addressed explicitly. 
D Set up mechanisms to monitor and manage expectations in advance  
As the partnership is consolidated and experience is gained through operations on the ground, 
partners will continue to assess their positions and issues. It is imperative that partners avoid 
gradual divergence in vision that may come about as a result of these developments. This 
means that mechanisms should be established at the outset (regular meetings or other forms 
of contact with a pre-specified agenda, and possibly assessment tools) with which partners 
can manage their own and each other’s expectations in order to maintain shared vision. 
D Formalize agreements to the extent possible 
What possibilities exist for formalization (contracts, memorandum of understanding)? Can 
examples be found within the organization of existing contracts? What are the advantages or 
disadvantages of specific contracts, clauses etc.? Does the risk of damaging trust through 
contracts outweigh the risk of not formalizing the partnership at all? Clearly too much rigidity 
restricts flexibility and may be unrealistic. Yet the experience of ICCO suggests that 
formalization (e.g. the establishment of the Savannah Farmers’ Marketing Company (SFMC) 
in Ghana by ACDEP) as cornerstone of the partnership is a prerequisite for longer-term 
stability.
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9. MANAGING RELATIONS WITHIN THE PARTNERSHIP
Once the partnership is running, considerable effort is required to maintain it. Partners may 
join, repositioning may be required, partners may exit expectedly or unexpectedly. For 
instance, a partnership may be abandoned by some or all parties if problems arise or if the 
feasibility studies turn out negative. Actors may leave the partnership as their own goals and 
strategies diverge from the course taken. The reality of partnerships also demonstrates that 
partners are not always as reliable as expected, or that partners may be constrained by 
institutional forces and therefore unable to play their role effectively.  
It is important to maintain a balanced ‘helicopter view’ and avoid the pitfalls associated with 
these developments and the possibly unexpected responses of partnership members to those 
developments. Moreover, there are matters beyond the partnership’s control: the emergence 
of new competitors in the chain, changes in the institutional environment (e.g., government 
change in the donor- or host country). In light of the risks of ‘nasty surprises’ inherent to 
partnerships, the ability to anticipate change and react to it constructively it is vital. These 
relationships must be managed through stakeholder dialogue.
D Scenario planning 
If in the development phase the project becomes unfeasible, what opportunities exist for 
redirection? The case of Vlisco in Ghana is exemplary in this regard. Fortunately Guinness 
presented itself as a potential alternative, but some degree of scenario planning in advance 
seems desirable. Similarly, what if a partner exits the partnership (UFMB in Burkina Faso) or 
has to be abandoned (LCU in Uganda)? 
D Ongoing assessment 
A partnership needs to have mechanisms in place for evaluating progress, and they should be 
activated at the right time (not too soon) and by the right criteria (realistic ones). This 
involves assessments of the partnership as a whole (relative to development goals) as well as 
the performance of individual partners. E.g. are the right actors playing the right roles at the 
right time, and are all parties pulling their weight? Do the various parties feel that there is 
fairness in terms of taking credit for results achieved? Is there evidence that the partnership 
focuses too much on the needs of any given partner at the expense of the ‘greater good’? 
D Timeline / future 
As the partnership and the chain develop, adjustments will need to be made with respect to 
the timeline e.g. for reaching the growth phase or for taking strategic decisions on 
diversification, scale or value added. For example, is there still agreement on the time line, or 
is there a risk of some partners wanting too much too quickly? More concretely, is there 
agreement on what the role of profits should be as the chain enters the growth phase, i.e. to 
what extent should profits be reinvested in development of the chain? 
27
10. EXIT STRATEGIES
Just as chains have life cycles, the partnership should have a life cycle as well. The point of 
departure from the outset should be that the chain must eventually become self-sustaining to 
the point that intervention through partnerships can be reduced to a minimum or even 
becomes obsolete. This means that the partnership must be geared to making itself 
superfluous, unless repositioning e.g. through diversification necessitates renewed 
interventions. Even in the latter case, it should be emphasized that at some point, the market 
actors in the chain themselves will have to be able to incur the costs of repositioning or 
growth on their own. This not only beneficial to the chain and its actors, it frees up resources 
(e.g. for the NGO) to embark on new endeavors.  
Since the chains investigated for this collaborative research project are in their initial stages, 
little is known about the specifics of exit strategies. At this point only the Ghana case entails 
concrete plans for exit by ICCO. This exit is in the form of transition by the management of 
SFMC from ICCO10, ACDEP and others to the farmers themselves. While at this point it is 
unknown how this will play out, it is essential that the planning contain clear and explicit 
reference to an exit strategy on the part of the NGO, and perhaps an end to the partnership 
more generally so that the chain may truly be considered self-sustaining. 
The timing with respect to ending a partnership will be linked to assessments of external 
effectiveness (vis a vis the chain) as well as internal effectiveness (vis a vis internal 
stakeholders and internal goals). The life cycle approach taken above indicates that such a 
decision will be taken in the growth phase of the chain, depending on the type of 
development path chosen. Additional research will have to be conducted in the future to 
explore this aspect of partnerships further. 
10 ICCO’s involvement in managing SFMC is indirect but tangible through its SFMC board membership and 
support through the PSA technical assistance program. 
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Deliverables of the research project
In addition to this ‘rough guide to partnerships’, the collaborative research effort has 
produced the following documents:  
Phase I 
1. Position Paper (external publicaton):  
Van Tulder, R., Muller, A. & De Boer, D. (2004) Partnerships, Power and Equity in 
Global Commodity Chains, Position Paper on cooperation between companies and NGOs 
in Stimulating Sustainable Development. Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
o A ‘Position paper’ documenting the current state of knowledge in the 
academic literature on partnerships and global commodity chains, culminating 
in suggestions for a framework to integrate insights from both  
Phase II 
2. Field reports for Ghana, Uganda and Burkina Faso / Mali documenting field research on 
the three cases (internal documents) 
De Boer, D. & Noor, M. (2006a) A Case Study on Cooperation Between Companies and 
NGOs in Stimulating Sustainable Development in Northern Ghana. Utrecht: ECSAD / 
ICCO.
De Boer, D. & Noor, M. (2006b) A Case Study on Cooperation Between Companies and 
NGOs in Stimulating Sustainable Development in Uganda. Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO.
Timmer, D. & Van der Putten, F-P. (2006) A Case Study on Cooperation Between 
Companies and NGOs in Stimulating Sustainable Development in Burkina Faso and 
Mali. Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
3. Link to host country development goals  (external publicaton): 
Fortanier, F. (2006) Multinational Enterprises, Commodity Chain Partnerships and Host 
Country Development Goals. Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO.
4. Overarching analysis (external publicaton): 
Muller, A., Noor, M., De Boer, D, Timmer, D., Van Putten, Frans-Paul, Van Tulder, R., 
& Fortanier, F. (2006) A Comparative Analysis of Commodity Chains, Partnerships and 
Development in Ghana (Sorghum, Burkina-Faso and Mali (Mangoes) and Uganda 
(Cotton). Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
o Overarching analysis of common themes and issues from the three cases, 
emphasizing the lessons learned both at a practical level and in terms of the 
academic debate on partnerships and global commodity chains.  
Including (vide Appendices A, B, C) 
Global Chain Overviews: Muller, A. (2005) Partnerships, Power and Equity In Global 
Commodity Chains: An Overview Of Global Commodity Chains in Tropical fruit, cotton 
and sorghum. Utrecht: ECSAD / ICCO. 
o An overview of ‘global commodity chains’ in tropical fruit, cotton and 
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